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CHAPTER 9

Challenges Facing
Investment Disputes:
Reconsidering Dispute
Resolution in International
Investment Agreements
Susan D. Franck∗
Henry Ward Beecher once observed, “[l]aws and institutions are constantly
tending to gravitate … [and] [l]ike clocks, they must be occasionally cleansed
and wound up, and set to true time.”1 Beecher’s comments reflect that, as law,
societies and governments evolve, there are inevitably challenging transitional
periods that require a re-examination of the foundations upon which a system
was founded. Dispute resolution systems are no different. When they undergo
fundamental growth, a re-consideration of the system’s efficacy and utility can
promote both its integrity and legitimacy to ensure it provides appropriate
services to its stakeholders.2
International investment law has experienced a particular growth. While the
number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) expanded in the past four decades,3
∗
1

2

3

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. Email: sfranck2@unl.edu.
Henry Beecher, Life Thoughts, Gathered from the Extemporaneous Discourses of Henry Ward Beecher
(Philips, Sampson and Company: 1858), p. 129.
For the purposes of this chapter, the word “stakeholder” is intended to refer to those persons or entities
either directly or indirectly affected by investment-related conflicts. Stakeholders most commonly take
the form of home countries, host countries, investors and the citizens of host countries.
“Bilateral Investment Treaties in the mid-1990s,” UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998)
[Hereinafter UNCTAD 1998].

143

Sauvant_Chapter 9.indd 143

2/12/08 7:22:23 PM

P III: P C  C

there has also been a more recent growth of disputes arising under these
agreements.4 Unsurprisingly, the escalation in the availability and use of the
dispute resolution process has led to a teething period. The boundaries of States’
previously untested international law obligations are being sketched; and parties
and non-parties have both cheered and jeered the efficacy, efficiency and
fairness of the system for resolving investment disputes. Given these developments, the system may have evolved to the point where it would be useful to
clean the proverbial clock.
This chapter explores, on a preliminary basis, how “dispute systems design”
could aid the dispute resolution process in investment treaties and permit
stakeholders to make a more informed choice about their dispute resolution
options. In other words, it considers whether the resolution of investmenttreaty disputes might be re-designed to minimize the cost of conflict and
maximize its beneficial byproducts. It first discusses the role of conflict and
the design of dispute resolution systems. Given the potential insights from
dispute systems design, it next assesses the unexplored or under-explored
utility of dispute resolution options along the dispute resolution continuum.
The chapter concludes by suggesting that a systematic greater consideration of
dispute systems design is needed in order to diagnose accurately what the
system requires and generate a set of principles to guide the design process.
The hope of such an endeavor would be to develop an effective, efficient, fair
and legitimate process for resolving investment treaty conflict.

Conflict, Dispute Systems Design and Investment Treaties
Reconsidering Conflict
In the classic formulation, conflict is like water. It occurs naturally and, although
its structure can be transformed, it will continue to exist. Despite its social
connotation, conflict is not per se good or evil. Rather, it is necessary for institutions to survive, thrive and develop. Nevertheless, extreme circumstances—
whether a flood or a drought—can have serious repercussions on effective
development.5
4

5

“Research Developments in International Investment Agreements,” UNCTAD Research Notes, UNCTAD/
WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/1, 30 August 2005 (http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/webiteiit20051_
en.pdf) [Hereinafter UNCTAD 2005a], pp. 1–3, 13–15; and “Investor-State Disputes Arising from
Investment Treaties: A Review,” UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4, (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20054_
en.pdf) [Hereinafter UNCTAD 2005b], pp. 4–6.
Cathy Costantino and Christina Sickles Merchant, Designing Conflict Management Systems: A Guide to Creating
Productive and Healthy Organizations (Jossey-Bass: 1996) [Hereinafter Costantino and Merchant 1996].
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This applies with equal force in the context of international investment.6
Conflict between investors and host country governments can occur when
there is dissatisfaction with an interaction, process or result. Conflict can be a
positive force, however. For investors, it can create opportunities for commercial
innovations, and governments can use it as an occasion to adapt how they
legislate and regulate those they govern.
When conflicts do arise, they can often be addressed informally without the
threat of legal sanctions—often because of personal relationships, the ability
to adapt business models or regulatory discretion that permits parties to
address their underlying needs and interests. These informal processes
can fail, however, and conflict can crystallize as a formal dispute. At either
the formal or informal stage of conflict management, having a properly
designed dispute resolution system can constructively draw conflict to the
surface, channel its productive forces and avoid potentially more destructive
by-products.

Approaches to Dispute Resolution
There is a robust literature dedicated to designing disputing systems to manage
conflict.7 This systematic approach to dispute resolution has been surprisingly
effective in reducing the negative by-products of conflict. Part of using dispute
systems design effectively, however, is to understand the different approaches
to dispute resolution.
In their pioneering work on dispute systems design, Ury, Brett and Goldberg
articulated a systematic way of looking at dispute resolution procedures. It
identified three fundamental approaches parties can use to resolve disputes:
(1) using power (in the form of violence, war, strikes) to impose a solution;
(2) relying on legal rights to determine the merits of parties’ positions; and
(3) focusing on parties underlying interests to create mutually acceptable

6

7

J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, 4th Edition (Cambridge University Press: 2005) [Hereinafter
Merrills 2005], p. 1.
Costantino and Merchant, 1996; Allan J. Stitt, Alternative Dispute Resolution for Organizations: How to
Design a System for Effective Conflict Resolution (Wiley: 1998) [Hereinafter Stitt 1998]; William L. Ury,
Jeanne M. Brett and Stephen B. Goldberg, Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of
Conflict (Jossey-Bass: 1988) [Hereinafter Ury et al. 1988]; see also Susan D. Franck, “Integrating Investment
Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design,” 92 Minn. L. Rev. 161 (2007) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=969252) [Hereinafter Franck 2007].
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solutions that meet parties’ needs. Ury et al. expressed a general preference for
interest-based dispute resolution as it tends to reduce transaction costs,
improve satisfaction with the result and decrease the probability that disputes
will recur. Nevertheless, they acknowledged that there are circumstances when
resolving disputes on the basis of rights or power may be necessary—or simply
desirable—particularly where uncertainty about the boundaries of parties’
legal rights inhibits negotiation, or when a fundamental societal value is at
stake.8 Later scholars have suggested that many dispute resolution systems
might start with power-based dispute resolution methods, but they eventually
move toward a more rights-based methodology and ultimately evolve to
interest-based conflict management.9
Having articulated these primary approaches to resolving disputes, Ury and
his colleagues suggested that institutions create effective conflict management
systems by engaging in: (1) diagnosis of the current system, (2) creation of a
dispute resolution system according to practical principles,10 (3) implementation

8
9
10

Ury et al. 1988, pp. 4–17.
Costantino and Merchant 1996, pp. 49–54.
Originally, Ury et al.’s principles related to: (1) focusing on interests to encourage the use of interest-based
dispute resolution, (2) providing loop-backs to make procedures available that allow parties to return to
lower-cost dispute resolution methods, (3) providing low-cost interest-based rights and power or rightsbased procedures if the interest-based ones fail, (4) building in consultation before and after disputes,
(5) arranging the procedures in a low-to-high cost sequence, and (6) providing the motivation, skills and
resources necessary to ensure that the procedures are supported (Ury et al. 1988). Others have since
developed different, but related, principles.
Costantino and Merchant, for example, use six different guiding principles including: (1) developing
guidelines for whether ADR is appropriate, (2) tailoring the ADR process to the particular problem,
(3) building-in preventative methods of ADR, (4) making sure that disputants have the necessary knowledge and skill to choose and use ADR, (5) creating ADR systems that are simple and easy to use and
resolve the disputes early, at the lowest organizational level, with the least bureaucracy, and (5) allowing
disputants to retain maximum control over choice of ADR method and the selection of a neutral.
(Costantino and Merchant, 1996).
Shariff has continued this analysis in an international context and suggests analyzing issues of membership, scope, centralization, control and flexibility. He suggests these issues should be considered in conjunction with the following principles, namely that institutions should: (1) strive for inclusiveness by
incorporating into their structure all stakeholders likely to be affected by the institution’s work, (2) seek
broad coverage of many related issues of interest to the institutional membership rather than being limited to a specific or narrow issue area, (3) seek depth of jurisdiction on individual issues areas such that
they are empowered to take many kinds of action on issues within their mandate, (4) seek to build central
sources of information gathering and dissemination, (5) decentralize and proliferate discussions and conversations among institutional members in multiple forums and forms, (6) vest control over decisions in
those most interested and affected by them, and (7) embed opportunities for regular review of principal
design decisions in order to integrate learning from experience (Khalil Z. Shariff, “Designing Institutions
to Manage Conflict: Principles for the Problem Solving Organization,” 8 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 113 (2003)
[Hereinafter Shariff 2003]).
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and approval of the new design, and (4) evaluation of the design and diffusion
of the procedures to the rest of the institution.11 Using these tools, Ury and his
colleagues transformed distressed dispute systems—where parties resolved
small conflicts by immediate resort to power struggles—into healthier systems.
Their efforts focused on designing dispute systems that permit interest-based
dispute resolution and, should these efforts fail, relied upon rights-based
adjudication—and only used power as a last resort. This remodeling of the
dispute resolution architecture had significant benefits. Not only was there an
improvement in the result, institutional integrity and ongoing relationships,
but there were also reduced transaction costs in terms of lost time, money,
emotional investments and opportunities.12

Investment Treaties and Dispute Resolution Options
Given its success, Ury’s conception of dispute systems design has grown
beyond its original use in U.S. domestic law.13 Commercial entities and government institutions increasingly resort to conflict management to establish a
web of dispute settlement methods to meet the particular needs of the parties’
and the dispute.14 Even with its success in these other contexts, there has been
surprisingly little literature that considers the utility of dispute resolution
design for investment disputes arising from or related to bilateral investment
treaties.
There does appear, however, to be a need for a more systematic consideration
of dispute resolution options. Commentators question whether the dispute

11

12
13

14

Costantino and Merchant have a similar approach. They recommend first identifying and involving the
appropriate stakeholders and then finding an appropriate dispute systems designer to conduct an organizational assessment. Next, create a design architecture to consider where, when and how to use ADR on
the basis of identified principles. After training and educating the stakeholders on the use of the system,
the program can then be implemented, evaluated and revised as necessary (Costantino and Merchant
1996).
Ury et al. 1988.
Lisa Bingham, “Mediation at Work: Transforming Workplace Conflict at the United States Postal Service,”
IBM Center for the Business of Government (2003) [Hereinafter Bingham 2003]; Peter Robinson, Arthur
Pearlstein and Bernard Mayer, “DyADS: Encouraging ‘Dynamic Adaptive Dispute Systems’ in the
Organized Workplace,” 10 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 339 (2005) [Hereinafter Robinson et al. 2005].
Francisco Orrego Vicuña, “Arbitration in a New International Alternative Dispute Resolution System,”
18(2) News from ICSID (2001) (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/n-18-2-1.htm) [Hereinafter
Vicuña 2001]; Shariff 2003.
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resolution system is in crisis,15 while UNCTAD suggests concerns “could be
addressed by improving the dispute settlement procedures” and ICSID revises
its arbitration procedures.16 Presumably changes might reduce financial
exposure (of investors and host countries), improve public perception of how
investment disputes are managed and possibly prevent future disputes.
Irrespective of whether change is needed or implemented, if the re-evaluation
is done in a transparent and co-operative manner, the process of evaluating
has the potential to strengthen the credibility and institutional legitimacy of
the process of resolving investment disputes.
This section will first consider the historical roots and current dispute
resolution systems embossed in investment. It will then consider various
dispute resolution options and evaluate their unique costs and benefits.
Thereafter, the future of managing investment treaty conflict can be assessed
in light of the current structure and other potential options.

a. The Evolution of Investment Dispute Resolution
Recall how conflict scholars suggest that dispute systems evolved. Costantino
and Merchant suggested early systems focus on power dynamics; but as they
transform, there is a focus on judicialization and rights-based adjudication;
and ultimately systems evolve toward a more interest-based conflict management
system.17 Likewise, Ury et al. observed that systems are often distressed where
they resort to the use of force or power as a matter of course to resolve
disputes; but when systems focus on rights and interests, they become more
effective and efficient.18 This is not dissimilar from the evolution of the resolution
of investment treaty conflict.
15

16

17
18

Susan D. Franck, “The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions,” 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521 (2005) [Hereinafter Franck 2005a];
Charles H. Brower, II, “Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter,” 36 Vand. J. Transnat’l
L. 37 (2003) [Hereinafter Brower 2003]; Ari Afilalo, “Towards a Common Law of International Investment:
How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve Their Legitimacy Crisis,” 17 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 51,
88 (2004) [Hereinafter Afilalo 2004].
UNCTAD 2005b, pp. 53–54; ICSID, “Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration,”
(22 October 2004), (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/improve-arb.pdf) [Hereinafter ICSID
2004]; ICSID “Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations: Working Paper of the ICSID
Secretariat,” (12 May 2005) (http://worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/052405-sgmanual.pdf) [Hereinafter
ICSID 2005]; ICSID Convention Rules and Regulations, ICSID/15 (April 2006) (http://worldbank.
org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm) [Hereinafter ICSID Basic Documents 2006].
Costantino and Merchant 1996, pp. 49–54.
Ury et al. 1988.
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Governments historically relied on the use of force and “gunboat diplomacy”
to resolve investment disputes. Given the costs—and the failure of this process
to encourage foreign investment—States evolved away from this model.
Instead, they shifted to a focus on rights. In an effort to promote foreign investment and instill confidence in the stability of the investment environment,
States promulgated treaties that created substantive obligations.19 These efforts
primarily began with so-called “Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation,” and ultimately developed into more structured investment agreements (such as BITs) or other investment agreements (such as multilateral
agreements, for example the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]
and the Energy Charter Treaty [ECT]).20 The treatification of rights and
obligations marked a shift away from power-based dispute resolution and a
move toward the development of a rights-based system of neutral adjudication.
This sea change affected two main areas of international investment law. First,
it offered a new, mutually agreed set of substantive rights to foreign investors
for rights, including expropriation, national treatment and fair and equitable
treatment.21 Second, for the first time, States offered foreign investors a dispute
resolution system that permitted investors to enforce directly their new
substantive rights against a host government.22
This second aspect is noteworthy. It meant that investors were not simply
granted an illusory promise—they were also granted a forum for redressing
violations of their substantive rights. Prior to this development, when government conduct adversely affected their investment, investors were relegated to
a series of somewhat unappealing dispute resolution options. These options
often left investors to the political mercies of either their own or the host
country government in deciding how (if at all) to address an investor’s
complaints. Specifically, investors might attempt to negotiate directly with
government officials—but they would often be ignored. Likewise, they might
lobby government officials in their home jurisdiction to either engage in
diplomatic negotiations with the host country government or espouse a claim
before the International Court of Justice—and they would often be ignored.

19

20

21

22

Franck 2005a, pp. 1525–1526; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice
(Kluwer: 1992), pp. 7–22.
M. Sornarajah, International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press: 1994) [Hereinafter
Sornarajah 1994], pp. 231–237; Guillermo A. Alvarez and William W. Park, “The New Face of Investment
Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11,” 28 Yale J. Int’l L. 365 (2003), pp. 366–367.
Giorgio Sacerdoti, “Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection,” in Recueil
Des Cours, vol. 269 (Brill Academic: 1997) [Hereinafter Sacerdoti 1997].
Franck, 2005a, pp. 1541–1545.
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Investors also might consider suing host country governments in their home
country courts—but this was often fruitless where host countries had recourse
to the defense of sovereign immunity.23 In other cases, investors might have to
address the conflict unilaterally. They might simply absorb the cost of adverse
government action by either doing nothing or making a claim under their
political risk insurance.24 In extreme cases, investors might consider resorting
to physical violence as a self-help remedy.25
The “arbitration addition” was revolutionary. It gave investors direct—and
nearly unfettered—access to host country governments, which promised to
resolve claims arising under investment treaties through what amounted to a
sophisticated choice of forum clause.26 Although there may be preconditions
to arbitration,27 once the conditions are satisfied, treaties typically give investors
the right to make an election amongst pre-determined dispute resolution
options to resolve a dispute.28 Once an investor makes the election, the host
country government must resolve the matter under the investor’s preferred
methodology. For example, investment treaties permit investors to choose
among: (1) litigating disputes before the host country government’s national
courts, (2) arbitrating disputes before ICSID or (3) arbitrating disputes before
an ad hoc tribunal that is bound by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.29
Part of this “judicialization” of managing investment treaty conflict may be
due in part to an evolution in the use of and expectations about international

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th Edition (Oxford University Press: 2003),
pp. 677–715; Sacerdoti 1997, pp. 412–415.
Jeswald W. Salacuse, “Explanations for the Increased Recourse to Treaty-Based Investment Dispute
Settlement: Resolving the Struggle of Life Against Form?” in Karl Sauvant, ed., Coherence and Consistency
in International Investment Law (Oxford University Press: 2007); Franck 2005a, pp. 620–621.
The BBC has reported on a British-owned gold mining company in Ghana that allegedly engaged in a
practice of shooting illegal miners on sight. Angus Stickler, Ghana’s Ruthless Corporate Gold Rush (18 July
2006) (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/file_on_4/5190588.stm). The story does not indicate
whether this action was part of the company’s normal commercial operation or was, perhaps, a result of
the government’s failure to provide full protection and security.
Susan D. Franck, “The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do
Investment Treaties Have A Bright Future?” 12 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 47 (2005) [Hereinafter
Franck 2005b].
See infra section A(3)(b) for a discussion of the current system of resolving investment disputes, including the use of non-binding dispute resolution and other preconditions to arbitration.
Christopher Schreuer, “Traveling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the
Road,” 5 J. World Invest. and Trade 231 (2004) [Hereinafter Schreuer 2004].
This is one area in which investor-State and State-to-State dispute resolution diverge. State-to-State arbitration does not generally permit a government to make an election as to the final dispute resolution
method.
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arbitration. Historically, arbitration was not a forum where decision-makers
were prized for their impartiality; rather, arbitrators’ value came in their
exercise of expert professional discretion, facility to create unique solutions,
ability to recommend settlement terms to parties, capacity to act as an internal
partisan during deliberations, or some combination of these factors.30
Under these conditions, the popularity of international arbitration waxed and
waned over time.31 As it has evolved in an international context, however,
arbitration has shifted away from a group of “grand old men” dispensing
discretionary wisdom. Instead, in the twentieth century, the process has
blossomed. Today, international arbitration technocrats focus on creating a
fair and impartial process that results in an award based upon the factual
record and independent legal analysis.32
Part of this judicialization may account for arbitration’s success in the resolution
of public and private international disputes. In the private international law
context, as international trade has flourished, arbitration has become the
primary vehicle for the resolution of international commercial disputes. Its
popularity and success can be attributed to a variety of sources including its
neutrality, speed, cost, confidentiality, ability to select an expert adjudicator
and the ease of enforcement under the New York Convention for the
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.33
In the public international context, arbitration has also found fertile ground. It
has caused politicians such as Benjamin Franklin to remark “When will
mankind be convinced and agree to settle their difficulties by arbitration?”34
and motivated William Jennings Bryan to attempt to prevent World War I by
promoting treaties to foster the resolution of disputes by arbitration.35 In the
investment context, treaties such as the Jay Treaty (1794)36 and Treaty of
30

31
32

33

34
35
36

Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the
Construction of Transnational Legal Order (University of Chicago Press: 1996) [Hereinafter Dezalay and
Garth 1996]; Laura J. Cooper, “The Process of Process: The Historical Development of Procedure in Labor
Arbitration,” in Arbitration 2005: The Evolving World of Work, Proceedings of the Fifty-Eighth Annual
Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators, Bureau of National Affairs, vol. 99 (2006).
David J. Bederman, International Law Frameworks (Foundation Press: 2001), p. 238.
Dezalay and Garth 1996; Catherine Rogers, “Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of
Conduct for International Arbitration,” 23 Mich. J. Int’l L. 347, 353 (2002) [Hereinafter Rogers 2002].
Jan Paulsson, “Dispute Resolution,” in Robert Pritchard, ed., Economic Development, Foreign Investment,
and the Law (Kluwer: 1996), pp. 211–212 [Hereinafter Paulsson 1996].
Brainy Quotes (http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/b/benjaminfr169230.html).
Michael Kazin, A Godly Hero: The Life of William Jennings Bryan (Knopf: 2006).
Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.–Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 116 [hereinafter Jay
Treaty].
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Ghent (1814) began using arbitration for resolving investment-related
disputes by giving creditors access to an international commission to press
their claims. Article VI of the Jay Treaty, for example, provided British
creditors with the right to adjudicate claims for compensation; and Article VII
granted U.S. creditors similar rights against the British government.37
Where tribunals adhered to articulated rules and engaged in reasoned legal
analysis, arbitration tended to be successful. Cases such as the Alabama Claims
case, which involved Britain’s responsibilities as a neutral during the U.S. Civil
War, marked a watershed in the development of international arbitration. The
U.S. and British governments established a five-member tribunal composed of
nationals from the U.S., Britain, Italy, Switzerland and Brazil. Following a strict
juridical procedure and the parties’ agreed lex specialis, the tribunal issued a
reasoned award against Britain, which was paid.38 Nevertheless, where early
“arbitrations” were not pure applications of the rule of law but a blend of
juridical and diplomatic considerations, there were concerns that arbitration
was an extension of gunboat diplomacy and/or imperialism.39

b. The Status Quo for Resolving Disputes
At present, treaties are individually negotiated between and among sovereign
governments. Without a multilateral agreement on investment, there is no
uniform treatment of dispute resolution methods in investment treaties.40
Although there are exceptions, there does appear to be a general trend,
however. In particular, the resolution of investor-State treaty claims occurs
primarily through some type of non-binding dispute resolution and/or
arbitration. State-to-State dispute resolution exhibits a similar pattern.41
37

38
39

40

41

Merrills, however, has suggested that this was not arbitration in its modern conception. Rather, it was
“supposed to blend juridical with diplomatic considerations to produce (in effect) a negotiated
settlement.” (Merrills 2005, p. 92).
Id., pp. 94, 105.
Id., pp. 92–93; Bederman 2001, p. 238; Barton Legum, “The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration
under NAFTA,” 43 Harv. Int’l L.J. 531, 534–535 (2002) [Hereinafter Legum 2002].
Scholarship in related to dispute resolution design could benefit from an empirical analysis of the most
common dispute resolution systems (and most prominent exceptions) provided in BITs. It is, however,
very difficult to analyze these matters. See, e.g., Jason W. Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical
Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties (May 2006) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=903680). Nevertheless, this chapter relies upon publicly available discussions about the content and
scope of dispute resolution provisions.
At present, investment treaties contain a unique combination of both State-to-State dispute resolution and
investor-State dispute resolution (Franck 2005b). While this chapter focuses primarily on investor-State
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In the investor-State context, BITs generally call for the “amicable resolution”
of disputes. Commentators suggest that this provision is intended to refer to
the use of non-binding dispute resolution mechanisms such as negotiation,
mediation or conciliation to resolve disputes.42 NAFTA is slightly more
precise, requiring that “disputing parties should first attempt to settle a claim
through consultation or negotiation.”43 Nevertheless, while the ambiguity may
have been intended to preserve flexibility and the informality of the dispute
resolution process, the lack of guidance creates difficulties. The meaning of
these obligations is not explained; particularly for legal cultures with different
dispute resolution traditions, it fails to articulate mutual expectations about
how the parties should begin to attempt to resolve their dispute. Moreover,
there are no mandates particularizing what the process should entail and how it
should be accomplished. This lack of a clear consent to procedural parameters
and the lack of substantive obligations leave the “amiable resolution”
methodology with little force. It is unclear what effect these provisions have
had on the resolution of investment disputes.
Irrespective of whether this unparticularized form of dispute resolution is
required or simply recommended,44 there is usually a time limit on how long
it must continue. Treaties generally require, for example, that after submitting
a notice of dispute investors wait three or six months before filing an official
request for arbitration. This suggests the waiting period is primarily intended
to provide more of a “cooling off ” period to permit parties to gather resources
and develop an internal strategy for dispute resolution prior to the commencement of adjudication. By way of example, Schreuer observed that Article 11 of
the German model BIT provides “Divergencies [sic] concerning investments …
should as far as possible be settled amicably …. If the divergency cannot be

42

43
44

arbitration, to complete a thorough analysis of the system, both aspects of the system deserve serious and
individual consideration. (United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations 1988, pp. 66–70;
UNCTAD 1998, pp. 92–96; Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Martinus
Nihjoff Publishers: 1994) [Hereinafter Dolzer and Stevens 1994], pp. 119–120; “Dispute Settlement:
General Topics, Dispute Settlement: Investor-State,” UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/30 (2005). (http://www.unctad.
org/en/docs/iteiit30_en.pdf) [Hereinafter UNCTAD 2003b], pp. 12–14.
Noah Rubins, “Comments to Jack C. Coe, Jr.’s Article on Conciliation,” 21(4) Mealy’s Int’l Arb. Rep. 21
(2006) [Hereinafter Rubins 2006]; Schreuer 2004.
NAFTA Art. 1118.
Generally, BITs do not require mandatory non-binding dispute resolution, such as conciliation or
mediation. Where conciliation is present, it may be offered under established procedures (such as the
UNCITRAL, ICSID Conciliation Rules or ICSID Additional Facility Conciliation Rules). Particularly in
investor-State disputes, it is typically an option offered either prior to or instead of arbitration
(Rubins 2006).
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settled within six months of the date when it has been raised by one of the
parties in dispute, it shall … be submitted for arbitration.”45
Beyond the question of whether or not BITs provide for non-particularized
“amicable settlement” or conciliation, most BITs do provide that arbitration is
the final method for resolving treaty-based claims. Given the textual prevalence of arbitration provisions in BITs—and the absence of less systematic reliance on other forms of dispute resolution—it appears that arbitration has
historically been the presumed “best” mechanism for resolving investment
disputes.46 There has, unfortunately, been little (if any) systematic or empirical
enquiry into whether this assumption is correct—and whether that
assumption is equally applicable to investor-State and State-to-State dispute
resolution. It is, for example, generally unclear whether drafters of model
BITs or individual treaties analyzed the utility of “cooling off ” periods, or
whether arbitration is the appropriate default dispute resolution mechanism.47
(See Annex 8, Novel Features in OECD Countries’ Recent Investment
Agreements.)

c. Understanding the Choice for Arbitration
In explaining the shift toward arbitration and the judicialization of treaty
disputes, some suggest the phenomenon occurred because an “increasing
number of capital importing countries came to realize that their self-interest
was served by agreeing to arbitrate investment disputes.”48 There has, however,
been little explanation or documentation of this phenomenon or why arbitration might also be in the interest of capital exporting countries. Moreover,
there has not been a coherent explanation of why other dispute resolution
systems were less desirable.
During the initial phase of BIT negotiation during the late 1950s and 1960s,
there does not appear to have been a systematic analysis of why arbitration
might be preferable to other dispute resolution options—either binding or

45
46
47

48

Schreuer 2004, p. 232.
Dolzer and Stevens 1994, pp. 119–122, 129–136.
The Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, which did provide for State-to-State dispute
resolution but failed to provide investors with a direct right to arbitrate disputes, is a notable exception to
this general trend (Dodge 2006).
Alvarez and Park 2003, pp. 366–368.
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non-binding.49 Thus, an over-reliance on arbitration is hardly surprising. The
“alternative dispute resolution revolution” did not start in the United
States until the late 1970s and did not gain significant prominence until the
1980s and 1990s; and the dispute systems design movement was in its
infancy during the late 1980s and early 1990s.50 It has taken even longer for the
benefits of alternative dispute resolution and dispute resolution design to find
a home across the Atlantic.51 It is curious, however, that even during the
surge of treaty drafting during the 1990s—after these two movements had
gained significant ground—there was little (if any) consideration for why
arbitration was still the preferred—let alone appropriate—method for
resolving disputes.
There are undoubtedly a variety of explanations for this phenomenon. First, as
the system of resolving investment treaty claims remained relatively untested
during this time, there was little need to re-evaluate the status quo. In other
words, changes were unnecessary as there was no visible evidence of dysfunction.
Second, as countries continued to draft model BITs and negotiate BITs on that
basis, there was likely institutional momentum to stick to the traditionally
approved format. Revisions or re-negotiation would require explanations at
various levels of government. Expending energy to make changes may not
have been worth the effort, particularly where treaties appeared to proffer the
promised rewards—namely foreign investment—and the disuse of the arbitration system meant there were minimal costs. Third, practical considerations
may have played a role. Although the business community may have started to
use interest-based mechanisms to resolve business to business disputes, they
may have been unwilling to endorse interest-based dispute resolution models
in the investor-State context without evidence of their successful implementation. Similarly, to the extent that non-binding, interest-based dispute resolution mechanisms like mediation and negotiation might exclude the public,
non-governmental organizations may not have been interested in advocating
for these dispute resolution processes.
Perhaps more importantly, treaty drafters may have used arbitration because it
was associated with tried and tested institutions. It was seen as working well

49
50

51

UNCTAD 1998; Dolzer and Stevens 1994.
Jean R. Sternlight, “ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where it Fits in a System of Justice,”
3 Nev. L. J. 289 (2003) [Hereinafter Sternlight 2003].
David J.A. Cairns, “Mediating International Commercial Disputes: Differences in U.S. and European
Approaches,” 60 Oct. Disp. Resol. J. 62 (2005) [Hereinafter Cairns 2005]; Vicuña 2001.
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and had the patina of international legitimacy. Thomas Franck52 has explained
that international institutions can become legitimate by affiliating with the
proven institutions of international law’s past.53 The Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal
was able to resolve disputes between foreign investors and host governments
using a process that adhered to the rule of law and—with one exception54—did
not require stakeholders to resort to physical violence to settle complaints.55
Meanwhile, the ICSID Convention created an institution designed to resolve
disputes through arbitration. More importantly, international commercial
arbitration was gaining steam with success of the New York Convention
and many countries adopting progressive arbitration laws based upon the
1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.
Arbitration seemed to be working. In contrast to cases resolved at the
International Court of Justice,56 investment disputes were getting resolved
efficiently. Sophisticated counsel was available to make effective arguments.
Parties were complying with awards, and streamlined enforcement mechanisms were readily available. In these circumstances, it was not unreasonable
to desire the continuation of a process that appeared to have some success in
achieving practical results.
Beyond the institutional legitimacy, there are practical reasons that arbitration
was seen as effective. International commercial arbitration has certain systematic
efficiencies in its model that could be grafted onto the investment treaty model.
For instance, the neutrality of international arbitration permits the independent
and impartial resolution of disputes. It escapes the perception of unfair local
advantage or outright partiality of the court system in favor of the host
government. In addition, rather than engaging in lengthy litigation before a
national or international court, arbitration was presumed to save time, money
and other internal resources. Although they outsource authority to resolve
the dispute, parties retain a degree of control over the process of resolving

52
53
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55
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The author of this essay is unrelated to Professor Franck.
Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press: 1990).
Memorandum Re: Challenge to Arbitrators Kashani and Shafeifei by the Government of the United States
of America, 7 Iran U.S.-Cl. Trib. Rep. 281, 292 (1986). One Iranian judge was quoted as saying: “If
Mangard ever dares to enter the tribunal chamber again, either his corpse or my corpse will leave it rolling
down the stairs.” Iranian Judge Threatens A Swede at The Hague, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1984, at A5.
Subsequently, the Tribunal’s President suspended all tribunal proceedings. U.S.–Iran Arbitration Suspended
at The Hague, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1984, at A9.
Charles N. Brower, The Iran– United States Claims Tribunal (Springer: 1998).
See generally F. A. Mann, “Foreign Investment in the International Court of Justice: the ELSI Case,”
86 Am. J. Int’l L. 92 (1992); Case Concerning Eletronica Sicula, S.p.A (ELSI), United States of America
v. Italy, 1989, I.C.J. Reports 4.

156

Sauvant_Chapter 9.indd 156

2/12/08 7:22:26 PM

R D R  I I A

the conflict. Not only can they select their decision-makers, but they can also
tailor the arbitration process to meet their needs and the peculiarities of a
specific investment dispute. There were other unique aspects of arbitration
that made it a desirable alternative to litigation before national or international
courts. In particular, arbitration was confidential and would permit parties to
preserve sensitive commercial data, prevent adverse publicity and preserve
ongoing relationships. Arbitration also had a streamlined enforcement
mechanism, which made it preferable to having to enforce a judgment through
the U.N. Security Council or needing to engage in time-consuming national
court litigation to enforce foreign court judgments.57 Ultimately, investment
treaty arbitration has been seen to resolve disputes and, after exhausting
contested awards through the normal legal process, parties have generally
paid awards.
Nevertheless, one wonders whether a different dispute resolution system
would be more efficient, effective and better address concerns of stakeholders.
It would, however, be imprudent to presume a different system would be superior
to the current framework without a diagnosis of the system, consideration of
the dispute design and an assessment of the costs and benefits. The implications
are not insignificant. While there have been concerns about transparency,
consistency, fairness and regulatory authority, choosing a different system for
resolving disputes may ameliorate the problems or perhaps simply lead the
issues to manifest themselves in a different fashion. The goal should be to
purify the waters of investment-related conflict rather than contaminating the
water supply.
The use of dispute systems design to diagnose and assess the current system’s
dispute resolution needs may be one way to begin this process. Future work
can and should consider the specific application of dispute systems design for
the resolution of investment treaty conflict. It might, for example, consider
how to do a conflict assessment, analyze existing patterns of disputing and
consider what are the appropriate principles upon which a system should be
based.58 In connection with this, this chapter turns to a systematic consideration
of different options for resolving investment treaty conflict and how they are
used (if at all) to manage conflict effectively.
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Recently, however, there has been concern as to the enforceability of investment treaty awards,
particularly in the context of the claims against Argentina; see, e.g., Osvaldo J. Marzoti, “Enforcement of
Treaty Awards and National Constitutions (the Argentinean Cases),” 7 Bus. L. Int’l 226 (2006).
Franck 2007.
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The Range of Options: Appropriate Dispute Resolution and
the Dispute Resolution Continuum
It is essential to place the resolution of investment disputes in its wider
context. “The settlement of any dispute, not just investment disputes, requires
the adoption of the most speedy, informal, amicable and inexpensive method
available.”59 Finding the most “appropriate” mechanism for resolving specific
categories of types of investment disputes, however, can be challenging.
Nevertheless, there are decided benefits to tailoring a design to the unique
needs of the particular system. These benefits might include the promotion of
democratic values, minimizing resources exerted on dispute resolution,
increasing productivity, increasing satisfaction with outcomes, decreasing the
recurrence of disputes and improving public relations.60 Finding the appropriate
dispute resolution is therefore a matter of some importance.
Historically, the term “ADR” has been viewed as “alternative dispute resolution.” There has, unfortunately, been confusion about what that term means.
In a domestic context, “alternative dispute resolution” has tended to mean any
dispute resolution process that occurs outside national courts; but because of
its prevalence in the international context, there has been some debate as to
whether arbitration was truly “alternative” dispute resolution.61 While this is
an interesting intellectual debate, it is a distraction from the fundamental need
to provide for the appropriate and effective resolution of investment disputes.
Therefore, for present purposes, “ADR” is defined as an appropriate dispute
resolution mechanism. In an effort to facilitate the creation of a dispute
resolution system that functions effectively and meets systemic needs for
managing conflict, the purpose of this section is to consider the spectrum of
mechanisms—whether non-binding, binding or hybrids—that are available to
stakeholders for resolving investment disputes.
Beyond the problem of defining ADR, there is also a confusion that persists in
many jurisdictions and different cultures as to the meaning of specific ADR
alternatives. This lack of a common understanding and mutual expectations
59
60

61

UNCTAD 2003b, p. 11.
Richard C. Reuben, “Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the New Workplace,” 10
Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 11 (2005) [Hereinafter Rueben 2005]; CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution,
Resource Book For Managing Employment Disputes (2004); Ury et al. 1998.
Paulsson 1996, p. 210; Vicuña 2001; Ucheora Onwuamaegbu, “The Role of ADR in Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: The ICSID Experience,” 2(2) News from ICSID, 12 (2005) (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
news/news_22–2.pdf) [Hereinafter Onwuamaegbu 2005].
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has significant implications.62 For example, Amy Cohen eloquently explains:
“Mediation changes as it travels; its instantiation anywhere is subject to local
variation and intervention as it makes contact with state and customary law,
politics, and social struggles.”63 Given different cultural understandings and
the potential for mismatched expectations at a sensitive juncture in the
dispute resolution process, it is vital to create a common lexicon. Establishing
this framework will assist in framing future analysis and debate, foster an
appreciation for variations in the approaches and permit stakeholders to make
informed choices.
Theoretically, there are a variety of options for resolving investment treated
disputes. The classic formulation in dispute resolution circles is that the “forum
[should] fit the fuss.”64 In order to make an informed choice of the appropriate
of the design of a dispute resolution system, it is useful to consider the options
along the dispute resolution continuum that might be employed individually
or in combination to resolve investment-related disputes. Once the spectrum
of choices is clear, designing dispute systems is more efficient.65
Stressing that “arbitration is only one of many ADR choices,” Costantino and
Merchant identify six broad categories of ADR options: preventative, negotiated, facilitative, fact-finding, advisory and imposed ADR.66 Each category
involves varying levels of third-party intervention, with their own distinct
costs and benefits; and each category can be implemented at different
junctures. In an effort to create a common framework for discussing ADR in
the context of investment law, this chapter adopts Costantino and Merchant’s
categories for understanding ADR mechanisms.67 The breadth and generality of
the categories promote understanding of the primary nature of the mechanism
without being hindered by the particularities of the distinct mechanisms
within the categories. Once the fundamental character of the process is defined,
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Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Houghton Mifflin
Company: 1981), p. 34.
Amy J. Cohen, “Debating the Globalization of U.S. Mediation: Politics, Power, and Practice in Nepal,”
11 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 295, 296 (2006).
Frank E.A. Sander and Stephen Goldberg, “Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to
Selecting an ADR Procedure,” 10 Negot. J. 49 (1994) [Hereinafter Sander and Goldberg 1994].
Costantino and Merchant 1996; Ury et al. 1988.
Costantino and Merchant 1996, pp. 37–41.
In Ury et al.’s conception of interest, rights and power-based dispute design system, the first five methods
are likely to be more interest-based and Imposed ADR is likely to involve rights-based adjudication.
Power-based resolution, as previously defined, can take the form of war, violence, strikes, or physical
aggression (Ury et al. 1988).
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it then identifies primary dispute resolution processes in the category. The
description of the various processes is by no means exhaustive. While there
will be variations and permutations, articulating the common framework—
and beginning to assess the costs and benefits of its elements—is a useful place
from which to start.
Preventative ADR
Preventative ADR mechanisms are designed to preempt disputes. Recognizing
that conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interactions, preventative ADR
methods do not try to stop conflict from arising; rather they channel potential
areas of disagreements into a problem-solving arena in order to avoid the
crystallization and escalation of disputes. In the context of investment
disputes, this might take various forms, such as negotiated rule making, the
use of good offices to engage in peer-review of the dispute or the use of an
ombudsperson.68
a. The Benefits of Negotiated Rulemaking and Good Offices
Encouraging host country governments to participate in negotiated rulemaking
in domestic administrative law can mitigate potential international law
conflicts at the outset rather than waiting until the harmful effects of the
regulation are apparent. There is a rich literature considering the value of
negotiated rule making in the United States.69 Undoubtedly, there would be
up-front costs related to the process of creating consensus, selecting the right
types of areas for negotiated rulemaking and addressing concerns about degree
of public participation. Nevertheless, proactively using negotiated rulemaking
to prevent disputes could have significant benefits. For instance, it could lead
to: the prevention of subsequent disputes, the modeling good government, an
improvement in the quality of government regulation, the promotion of
democratic values and the enhancement of governmental legitimacy.70
68

69

70

There are also other forms of preventative ADR partnering and joint problem solving. These, however,
may work best in a more commercial context.
Cary Conglianese, “Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking,”
46 Duke L.J. 1255 (1997) [Hereinafter Conglianese 1997]; Lawrence Susskind and Gerard McMahon,
“The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking,” 3 Yale J. on Reg. 133 (1985) [Hereinafter Susskind
and McMahon 1985].
Jody Freeman and Laura I. Langbein, “Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit,” 9 N.Y.U.
Envtl L.J. 60 (2000) [Hereinafter Freeman and Langbein 2000].
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Likewise, using “good offices” might have merit. In this instance, a person in a
position of authority and prestige could facilitate communications between
the parties and provide peer-review to prevent disputes from arising or
escalating.71 Although such preventive diplomacy has achieved mixed results
in the public international law context, it remains a potential tool in the
toolbox for governments seeking to maximize the utility of the design of their
dispute resolution system. UNCTAD has referenced the possibility of using
“good offices,” although it has not analyzed the issue systematically.72
Interestingly, UNCTAD appears to view “good offices” as a step to be taken
only after negotiated ADR mechanisms fail; but this should not prevent it from
being used as a preventative mechanism to check the escalation of disputes
and improve communication ex ante.
b. Opportunities with Ombuds
Ombuds might also be used to manage conflict and prevent the escalation of
disputes. Ombuds have their roots in China, Egypt and Germanic tribes, but
were used most prominently in connection with democratic governance in
Sweden, where they provided a bridge between private individuals and the
government. More recently, ombuds have been used successfully in the
United Kingdom, United States and the European Union, as well as in
corporate contexts.73
An ombudsperson is an official, appointed either by a public or private
institution, whose fundamental function is to remain impartial and receive
complaints and questions from a defined constituency about issues within the
ombuds’ express jurisdiction. The ombuds’ mandate is to resolve complaints at
an early stage. To carry out this method, ombudspersons have many tools.
They might direct constituents to other processes or opportunities that may
resolve the issues, or, they may raise the problem at an appropriate level within
the organization.74 In its classic definition, the ombudsperson is an “officer
appointed by the legislature to handle complaints against administrative and
71
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Linda C. Reif, “Conciliation as a Mechanism for the Resolution of International Economic and Business
Disputes,” 14 Fordham Int’l L.J. 578 (1991) [Hereinafter Reif 1991]; Bederman 2001, p. 236.
UNCTAD 2003b, pp. 11–12.
Harold J. Krent, “Federal Agency Ombuds: The Costs, Benefits and Countenance of Confidentiality,” 52
Admin. L. Rev. 17 (2000) [Hereinafter Krent 2000]; Vicuña 2001; Philip J. Harter, “Ombuds—A Voice for
the People,” Disp. Resol. Mag. (Winter 2005), p. 5 [Hereinafter Harter 2005].
Ombuds may also have authority to mediate disputes. By and large, they resolve conflict through a hybrid
process of investigation and conciliation in order to prevent the escalation of disputes.
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judicial action,” serving as a watchdog over those actions while exercising
independence, expertise, impartiality, accessibility, and powers of persuasion
rather than control.75 While they generally lack the power to make binding
decisions, order administrative conduct or reverse administrative action, their
capacity to make recommendations and to publicize their findings has an
impact. An ombudsperson’s “authority and influence derive from the fact that
he is appointed by and reports to one of the principal organs of state, usually
either the parliament or the chief executive.”76 Ultimately, an ombudpersons’
mandate is not to protect the organization’s reputation. Rather, his or her
objective is to promote reasoned, fair and ethical conduct in the organization
and to take a view based upon integrity, legality and principle.77
The use of ombuds has a level of built-in acceptance and confidence in both
the governmental and the corporate context. They first have the benefit of
history and a legacy of authority. Because ombuds are associated with a practice
that has a long, multi-cultural tradition that has been effective in many
contexts, this pedigree promotes symbolic validation, which lends the process
legitimacy.78 Ombuds offices have the benefit of equality, where those who are
affected by a conflict have a place to give voice to their concerns. Unlike an
investor’s unilateral right to bring claims under a treaty, investors, citizens and
governmental officials could have theoretical access to the ombuds office for
the filing of complaints.79
Beyond these more theoretical benefits, there are also practical benefits of
using ombudspersons to prevent disputes. For parties with investment-related
concerns, an ombuds office offers a clear line of authority for receiving complaints and lowers the cost of raising issues. This has the benefit of permitting
smaller investors or parties with smaller conflicts to have their concerns heard
and addressed. In essence, it facilitates access to justice and decreases the
stigma of announcing and quickly resolving disputes. While theoretically it
could increase the number of recorded disputes, presumably this would not
mean the number of disputes actually increased but, rather, there would be an
increase in reporting problems. Commentators have noted that “submitting
an investment dispute to arbitration under a treaty can decrease the chances of
75
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Shirley A. Wiegland, “A Just and Lasting Peace: Supplanting Mediation with the Ombuds Model,”
12 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 95, 96 (1996) [Hereinafter Wiegland 1996].
Krent 2000.
Wiegland 1996.
Franck 1990, pp. 91–110.
Wiegland 1996.
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amicable resolution of the dispute because settlement of a treaty claim requires
approval of additional decision-makers in the government and therefore
complicates any resolution.”80 Ombuds are a natural antidote to this. Rather
than letting problems fester and reach the boiling point, an ombudsperson
provides an early opportunity to intervene and improve the situation. In other
words, there is a formal process that allows parties to address issues informally
before ratcheting up the costs and formality of conflict resolution.
As there is often too little information and problems with disbursing the
available information at the beginning of a conflict, commentators have
suggested that the prospects of early settlement are often “dim”—particularly
when multiple agencies are involved.81 Ombuds, however, could provide an
antidote to this problem. Because an ombudsperson is an independent part of
the host country government, the office would be in a position to know the
agencies, entities or people whose involvement would be needed to resolve
matters.
The requirement, for example in an investment treaty, to establish an ombuds
office would require governments to determine in advance who would have
institutional responsibility for resolving investment-based disputes and with
whom ombuds should liaise. Using ombudspersons as an information conduit
would create an opportunity to manage conflicts more effectively when they do
arise and minimize the information vacuum in order to clear the way for early
(or easier) dispute resolution. As “the best chance to resolve a dispute between
a foreign investor and a government agency is likely before the investment
dispute becomes a dispute under an investment treaty,”82 ombuds provide a
unique opportunity to catch and resolve conflict before a dispute is crystallized.
This is a useful alternative to making a formal claim and dedicating institutional resources to win and/or litigate to the end, irrespective of the cost.
An ombuds office could also serve as a conflict barometer. It would alert
governments to where they are most likely to encounter difficulties; with that
information, they would be in a position to make more informed and rational
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Barton Legum, “The Difficulties of Conciliation on Investment Treaty Cases: A Comment on Professor
Jack C. Coe’s ‘Towards a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes—A Preliminary
Sketch,’” 21(4) Mealy’s Int’l Arb. Rep. 23 (2006) [Hereinafter Legum 2006]; Jack J. Coe, Jr., “Toward a
Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes—A Preliminary Sketch,” 12 U.S. Davis J.
Int’l L. and Pol’y 7 (2005) [Hereinafter Coe 2005].
Legum 2006.
Legum 2006.
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legislative and regulatory choices. Moreover, ombuds can enhance the image
and legitimacy of government agencies. While it could not make or change
policy, the presence of an ombuds office can encourage government officials to
support their decisions with sufficient reasoning. In addition, providing the
regulated public with a direct form of communication and feedback can
promote democratic values and institutional legitimacy.83

c. Challenges with Preventative Dispute Resolution
The same benefits, however, could create problems for governments, investors
and other interested parties. All of these types of Preventative ADR will share
common difficulties. Because they are not as frequently used, parties may be
hesitant to try them. In the case of negotiated rulemaking or good offices,
stakeholders may be unwilling to consider these options until a “mutually
hurting stalemate” exists. In other words, until the difficulties with the existing
system reach a point that is unbearable for all stakeholders, the system may
not be ripe for the use of these options.84
Similarly, governments may be unfamiliar with the process of using ombudspersons. Some governments may find it alien and undesirable. Beyond the
inertia of continuing with the status quo, governments may be unwilling to
expend the resources necessary to create such an office. They may believe, for
example, that there are an insufficient number of investment-related conflicts
to justify the establishment of an office. Moreover, the creation of an ombuds
office would front-load the process of managing disputes by requiring the
creation of structures. Should governments fail to see the down-stream,
long-term benefits of the creation of an ombuds office, they may decide the
cost is not worth the benefit.
There may also be other difficulties. As ombudspersons’ persuasive authority
comes from autonomy, expertise, neutrality and status, the office’s effectiveness
can be diminished when any of these essential characters are lacking or impaired.
Should an ombuds’ affiliation with the government be perceived to compromise
independence, people may be less willing to seek his or her assistance.
83
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Krent 2000.
Andrea Schneider, “The Day After Tomorrow: What Happens Once A Middle East Peace Treaty Is
Signed?” 6 Nev. L.J. 401 (2006); I. William Zartman, “Timing and Ripeness,” in Andrea Kupfer Schneider
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Ombuds should not be a mouthpiece of the government that institutionalizes
the status quo while ignoring the concerns of other stakeholders.85 In the past,
this has been one of the primary obstacles to using ombuds effectively.86 To
ensure proper neutrality and the ability to perform their core functions, any
ombuds office would need physical as well as fiscal independence from any
one constituency to minimize the appearance of bias.87
There may also be challenges related to confidentiality. There are disagreements
about whether communications to ombuds are privileged and whether confidentiality is appropriate. Certain stakeholders may assert that the transparency
of the ombuds process is critical to promote settlements that are in the public
interest. Meanwhile, other stakeholders might suggest confidentiality is fundamental to an effective process. A lack of confidentiality may create difficulties in
maintaining the perception of an ombud’s neutrality; and it may also inhibit the
full and frank disclosure of problems, which might chill the use of the ombuds
and frustrate a primary reason for its creation. One can imagine an investor with
a long-term regulatory relationship with a government who would be concerned
about government reprisals for the reporting of problems.88
These possible concerns are not trivial. Consideration should be given to ways
to address and neutralize these concerns to strike an appropriate balance.
Although the devil would undoubtedly be in the details, the promise of an
ombuds office should not be overlooked. The flexibility, distinct capacities and
institutional position provides a unique opportunity to constructively resolve
conflict. Ultimately, these preventative ADR methods hold the important
promise of preventing disputes from crystallizing and allowing parties to
allocate their resources effectively.

Negotiated ADR
Negotiated ADR involves communications between the parties to a conflict;
the result of such discussions will be either to create a mutually acceptable
resolution or terminate the process, presumably to pursue other ADR methods.
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Wiegland 1996.
Id.
If an ombud serves at the whim of a government with little job security, for example, he or she may be
tempted to forgo well-deserved criticism of administrative actions.
Krent 2000.
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All negotiations are not the same, however. Even if one agrees to negotiate,
parties can use different approaches to negotiation, which creates variations in
the negotiation process. Parties tend to adversarial bargaining,89 interest-based
bargaining,90 or a combination of these approaches91 during the negotiation
process. In adversarial bargaining, parties focus on legal rights, tactical positions, gaming the process, and the use of power to distribute limited resources.
Typically, this means a party will make extreme offers, offer few concessions,
make threats, and distort information in an effort to be the “winner” in what
is typically a win-lose scenario.92 In the interest-based approach, parties focus
on meeting their underlying needs and objectives in order to create joint solutions that fairly address their mutual interests. This approach tends to require
parties to separate people from the problem, focus on underlying interests,
generating a variety of options before deciding what to do, and making decisions based upon objective criteria.93
Irrespective of their theoretical approach, in the context of investment
disputes parties might use different types of negotiated ADR. The parties to the
dispute may use, for example, either direct or indirect forms of negotiation.

a. The Utility of Indirect Negotiation
Diplomacy is a form of indirect negotiation. In this process, investors might
encourage their home government to engage in private diplomatic discussions
with the host country to resolve their underlying complaints about host
government behavior. These government-to-government negotiations may
increase investors’ leverage. Having their home government to advocate on
their behalf brings political clout to the dispute resolution table and emphasizes
89
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This process has also been referred to in the literature as distributional or positional bargaining (Carrie J.
Menkel-Meadow, Lela Porter Love and Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Mediation: Practice, Policy and Ethics
(2006) [Hereinafter Menkel-Meadow et al. 2006], pp. 39–51).
This process is also referred to as problem-solving, integrative bargaining or principled bargaining; Id.
There is a broad literature on negotiation style. See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Bargaining for Advantage:
Negotiation Strategies for Reasonable People (Penguin: 1999); Martin A. Rogoff, “The Obligation to
Negotiate in International Law: Rules and Realities,” 16 Mich. J. Int’l L. 141 (1994) [Hereinafter Rogoff
1994]; Chris Guthrie, “Panacea or Pandora’s Box?: The Cost of Options in Negotiation,” 88 Iowa L. Rev.
601 (2003) [Hereinafter Guthrie 2003]. As a thorough discussion of this important point is beyond the
scope of this project, this chapter only provides a cursory overview of the literature.
Russell Korobkin, “A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation,” 88 Geo. L.J. 1789 (2000) [Hereinafter
Korobkin 2000].
Fisher and Ury 1981; Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, “Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving,” 31 UCLA L. Rev. 754 (1984) [Hereinafter Menkel-Meadow 1984].
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the importance of the claim. Such an approach may also expand the range of
potential solutions by introducing the resources of another party into the dispute
resolution process. Nevertheless, there are drawbacks. First, an investor’s home
government may have little interest in pursuing an investor’s claim; and investors
will have expended resources for a minimal return. Between 1960 and 1974, for
example, the United Nations identified 875 distinct governmental takings of
foreign property in 62 countries, but it unclear whether investors’ home governments ever pursued these claims.94 Second, should a government decide to
espouse an investor’s claim, investors run the risk of having their disputes inextricably intertwined with larger inter-governmental objectives. As a result, little may
come from the negotiation. Third, even if negotiations prove successful, investors
may find themselves subject to a unsatisfactory resolution over which they had
little input or control and which does not address their needs. Fourth, there may
be difficulties with enforcement of any diplomatic agreement.

b. The Benefits of Direct Negotiation
An investor also might engage in direct negotiations with a host country
government. This option gives more direct control over the process, management and result of the dispute resolution process. It also provides an opportunity to create a solution that is most likely to address the parties’ unique needs
and interests. Investors and the host country government may find negotiation
useful in the case of infrastructure projects, in which protracted dispute resolution may create alienation in a critical on-going relationship; or where there is
a desire to minimize the time and cost allocated to resolving small conflicts.
In the context of disputes being resolved primarily by arbitration, there is some
anecdotal evidence suggesting that parties have used direct negotiations
successfully. ICSID’s website suggests that several ICSID cases concluded with
settlement agreements. Some of these are BIT claims, such as AES Summit
Generation v. Hungary; and at least two BIT-based claims, Lemire v. Ukraine
and Goetz v. Burundi, have awards embodying settlement agreements.95
Interestingly, several of these cases have resulted in settlement after a
jurisdictional decision.96 Meanwhile, counsel for ICSID has also noted that
94
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Jeswald W. Salacuse, “BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign
Investment in Developing Countries,” 24 Int’l Law. 655, 659 (1990) [Hereinafter Salacuse 1990].
ICSID List of Pending and Concluded Cases 2006 (http://www.icsid.org).
ICSID does not have a publicly available list of investment treaty cases that have resulted in settlement.
A cursory analysis of ICSID’s website and other publicly available awards, however, indicates that, after a
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there are an “increasing percentage of ICSID [arbitration] cases that are discontinued following settlement.”97 There have also been negotiated settlements
in the context of ad hoc arbitration, such as in Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, which
also settled after a jurisdictional award.98
While this anecdotal evidence suggests negotiation has some promise for
resolving investment treaty conflict, there are several limitations. First, there is
little empirical evidence systematically analyzing the role that direct or indirect
negotiation plays in the resolution of investment disputes. It is therefore
unclear to what extent this anecdotal information is generalizable to a larger
population of investment disputes. Indeed, there may be a sample bias. Those
cases settling after the invocation of the ICSID arbitration mechanism may be
systematically different than those negotiated settlements arising in different
contexts. Likewise, because investment disputes are confidential (either
because they are not registered through the ICSID system or have not yet
escalated to become public knowledge), there may be fundamental variances
between confidential settlements and those cases for which there is public
information. Second, although it is clear that some cases are settling, the
confidential nature of the settlement means that it is impossible to analyze
how the negotiations occur and what factors affect parties’ willingness and
ability to settle. Third, because the settlements are confidential, it is difficult to
evaluate longitudinally compliance with the settlement, parties’ satisfaction
with the substantive result and the recurrence of later investment-related
disputes. It would, therefore, be useful to obtain empirical evidence to analyze
the potential benefits of negotiation.

c. The Common Challenges for Negotiated ADR
Despite its strengths, negotiated ADR inevitably has certain pitfalls. As a
non-binding and consensual mechanism, there are challenges related to

97
98

decision on jurisdiction, several BIT-based cases have settled, including: (1) Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic
Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, (2) IBM World Trade Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/10, (3) Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, and
(4) SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13.
(ICSID List of Pending and Concluded Cases 2006; ICIS List of Online Decisions 2006; Investment Treaty
Arbitration, Chronological Listing of Awards [as of 11 August 2006] [http://ita.law.uvic.ca/chronological_
list.htm]).
Onwuamaegbu 2005.
Coe 2005, pp. 29–30; ITA Awards 2006.
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securing consent to negotiate, how negotiations occur, the enforceability of
the agreement and the public nature of the rights.
Obtaining host country government consent to negotiate may prove challenging.
Particularly where governments are not required to negotiate, host country
governments might reject or ignore requests for consultation.99 There may
also be difficulties engaging in negotiation where there is intra-government
conflict. Governments may find it difficult to use negotiation when: (1) the
government is unaware one of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities
has engaged in conduct that has led to a dispute, (2) it is unclear what agency
is responsible for dispute resolution, (3) a responsible agency does not have
authority to settle the dispute, or (4) there may be no governmental resources
or funds appropriated to resolve the conflict. Particularly in a novel, complex
and inconsistent area like investment treaty law, settling disputes through
negotiation can be challenging because of the need for a clear record showing
the facts and the law that justify a settlement.100
Governments may also actively wish to avoid an investor’s approach for
negotiation when binding, rights-based adjudication is preferable. Parties may
believe adjudication will produce a substantially better result. Parties may also
wish to avoid the political fallout for not exhausting all of their legal rights or
agreeing to settle a politically sensitive dispute. In some cases it may be more
politically expedient to have a third-party impose a decision, rather than
having a compromise be seen as a betrayal of national interests.101 Beyond this,
parties may wish to pursue adjudication initially if is likely to create a more
favorable opportunities to negotiate a settlement in the future.
The negotiation process itself contains a series of challenges. Because it is
non-binding, parties need not pursue negotiation once it starts. Should parties
use negotiation to manipulate or delay the proceedings in pursuit of other
objectives, this can complicate the dispute resolution process. Negotiation can
also be ineffective if the parties’ positions are far apart and there are few
common interests to create a zone of possible agreement.102 Particularly for
parties using adversarial bargaining, the lack of certainty about the parties’
legal rights means parties become entrenched in their reasonable beliefs that

99
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Merrills 2005, pp. 23–24.
Rubins 2006; Legum 2006.
Rubins 2006.
Id.
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their case is stronger as a matter of law. This can translate into a belief that
compromise is unnecessary, which makes negotiation difficult.
The process can also be complicated by a “stakeholder problem,” where it is
unclear who must or should be present at the negotiation table. This can manifest itself in different ways. For example, having inappropriate people involved
in negotiations can create difficulties. There may be challenges identifying the
right persons who can negotiate effectively on behalf of a government and
commit the host country government to a settlement.103 This can create
challenges when a critical branch of government, a key government
representative or private entity is absent. Likewise, failure to include other
critical stakeholders—such as groups directly affected by the settlement—may
create problems. In any of these scenarios, this prevents the forging of a
consensus; or, even if an agreement is reached, the negotiated solution may
not properly resolve the underlying dispute. The end result is that negotiation
that is not handled properly is the breeding ground for future disputes.
Even if negotiations lead to a settlement, there may still be problems with
enforcement of settlement agreements. One can only imagine a change in
government or corporate leadership that leads a party to abandon the settlement agreement—at which point parties may need again to consider the ADR
implications.
Finally there may also be a category of concerns related to the public nature of
these rights. Investment treaty rights arise from public international law obligations and tend to implicate public issues.104 Particularly given the state of the
case law in this area, at least one scholar has articulated a concern that such
private resolution “is one less reasoned adjudication than might otherwise
have been available to contribute” to the development of the jurisprudence.105
Although written in the context of domestic dispute resolution, the work of
Owen Fiss suggests that any loss of the public adjudication of public rights is
likely to have an adverse affect on adjudicator’s capacity to redress power
imbalances and trivialize the remedial effects of claims designed to redress
public wrongs. To the extent that more formal and public adjudication are lost,
it runs the risk of imposing profound social costs.106
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Onwuamaegbu 2005.
Franck 2005b, pp. 70–77.
Coe 2006, p. 25.
Owen M. Fiss, “Against Settlement,” 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984) [Hereinafter Fiss 1984].
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There is no doubt that these are important considerations in choosing how to
resolve disputes, but this does not mean that the benefits of negotiation should
be overlooked. The opportunity to create tailor-made resolutions in a costeffective manner is a fundamental attribute. The goal should be to use dispute
systems design to help determine if, when and under what circumstances
should cases be negotiated.107

Facilitated ADR
Like its negotiated ADR counterpart, the goal of facilitated ADR is to harmonize parties’ expectations, refine claims, clarify the issues, encourage settlement, and thereby decrease transaction costs, improve satisfaction with the
result and prevent the recurrence of future disputes. It differs, however, in the
process by which these goals are achieved. Facilitated ADR involves a neutral
third-party assisting the disputants to reach a satisfactory resolution. This typically involves some form of conciliation or mediation. It might also involve
the use of an ombudsperson.

a. Distinguishing Mediation and Conciliation
In the international context, commentators suggest conciliation and
mediation are often used interchangeably.108 Doubtless, this is because both
processes involve a neutral third party assisting the parties to reach a solution
of their own accord.109 Employing the services of a third-party neutral to
resolve disputes peacefully is precisely why both mechanisms are a form of
facilitated ADR.
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Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, “Whose Dispute Is it Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of
Settlement (In Some Cases),” 83 Geo. L.J. 2663 (1995) [Hereinafter Menkel-Meadow 1995].
UNCTAD 2003b, p. 21; Coe 2005; Rubins 2006; Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of
International Commercial Arbitration, 4th Edition (Sweet and Maxwell: 2004). Redfern and Hunter nevertheless suggest at pp. 37–38 that a distinction might be appropriate. They note that a mediator “will
listen to an outline of the dispute and then meet each party separately—often ‘shuttling’ between them—
and try to persuade the parties to moderate their respective positions”. On the other hand, “a conciliator
was seen as someone who went a step further than the mediator, so to speak, in that the conciliator would
draw up and propose the terms of an agreement that he or she considered represented a fair settlement.”
Onwuamaegbu 2005; Luis Miguel Diaz and Nancy J. Oretskin, “Mediation Furthers the Principles of
Transparency and Cooperation to Solve Disputes in the NAFTA Free Trade Area,” 30 Denv. J. Int’l L.
and Pol’y 73 (2001) [Hereinafter Diaz and Oretskin 2001].
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Nevertheless, for the purposes of clarity, managing the expectations and creating
a common framework for discussion, this chapter draws a distinction between
the two concepts. The key difference between mediation and conciliation is
the degree and formality of the process.
Mediation is an informal process in which mediators tend to focus on identifying interests, reframing representations and canvassing a range of possible
solutions to move the parties toward agreement.110 There are many forms of
mediation, which might involve anything from a mediator serving as information conduit or creating an atmosphere to loosen tension, to engaging in
“shuttle diplomacy” to trying to transform the parties’ relationship.111 Mediation
is not about using a series of rules or legal rights to resolve disputes. Rather, it
uses a process-based model to bring two parties closer together toward
agreement. Although there are variations, most mediation tends to focus on
stages of dispute resolution including: (1) agreeing to mediate; (2) understanding
the problem by identifying issues and interests; (3) generating options; (4)
reaching agreement; and (5) implementing the agreement.112 What happens in
the individual dispute is largely a function of the parties, the nature of the
dispute and the orientation and approach of the mediator.
In contrast, given its historical roots in public international law, conciliation
tends to provide a more structured process.113 Rather than relying on general
guidelines, it is replete with formal rules related to jurisdictional objections,
potential pleadings, the gathering of evidence and issuing written recommendations for settlement.114 This makes the process more institutionalized, in a manner
akin to formal adjudication. Arbitration commentators acknowledge this and
describe conciliation as part of a “rules system” where the procedural formalities
are articulated in advance—like civil procedure or evidentiary rules—to indicate
how the process will operate and on what basis a neutral will make his or her
determination.115 In this sense, the formality of the process makes conciliation
looks more like non-binding arbitration.116 Nevertheless, as conciliation is aimed
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Merrills 2005; Reif 1991.
Menkel-Meadow et al. 2006.
Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation Training Guide (2004) [Hereinafter Riskin 2004]; Kathleen Severens, Basic
Mediation Training Manual, 5th Edition (International Institute for Negotiation and Conflict Management:
2005) [Hereinafter Severens 2005]; Diaz and Oretskin 2001, pp. 84–86.
Mary Ellen O’Connell, ed., International Dispute Settlement (Ashgate Dartmouth: 2003), p. xvi.
Merrills 2005; Reif 1991.
Rubins 2006.
Onwuamaegbu 2005.
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at settlement from the outset, parties may be more likely to reach agreement
than they would if participating in a full-scale adversary proceeding.117
Irrespective of whether it occurs in the context of mediation or conciliation,
third-party neutrals can vary in their orientation and approach.118 There are a
variety of different models of facilitative ADR. The approach of Len Riskin’s
famous “Grid System” asks neutrals to consider whether: (1) the parties wish
to define their dispute broadly or narrowly, and (2) the neutral should adopt
either an evaluative or facilitative orientation to problem-solving. In an
“evaluative” approach, neutrals may find themselves focusing more on evaluating
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the merits of parties’ factual and legal
contentions in order to push settlement in a particular direction. In contrast,
a “facilitative” approach may ask involved parties and the neutral party to
focus more on identifying creative “win-win” strategies.119
Gary Friedman and Jack Himmelstein have also developed an “understandingbased” model of mediation in which parties resolve their conflicts through
understanding their adversary’s perspectives, priorities and concerns.120 Other
scholars use transformative mediation as a means of transforming the relationship between disputing parties.121 Still others may find themselves moving
between different styles at different points in the process.122 Nevertheless,
regardless of the approach a particular neutral has, parties generally control
selection of the neutral(s) and—as part of the appointment process—may
condition appointment on using a particular set of tactics or approach during
the facilitative ADR process. Particularly given the multiplicity of definitions
available for both mediation and conciliation, setting expectations about what
to expect from the neutral and the dispute resolution process is useful.
117
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Lester Nurick and Stephen J. Schnably, The First ICSID Conciliation: Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Trinidad
and Tobago, 1 ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal 340, 349 (1986) [Hereinafter Nurick
and Schnably 1986].
Diaz and Oretskin 2001, pp. 86–87.
Leonard L. Riskin, “Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies and Techniques: A Guide for the
Perplexed,” 1 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 7 (1996) [Hereinafter Riskin 1996]; Leonard L. Riskin, “DecisionMaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System,” 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1
(2003) [Hereinafter Riskin 2003].
Gary J. Friedman and Jack Himmelstein, “Resolving Conflict Together: The Understanding-Based
Approach to Mediation,” 4 J. Am. Arb. (2005) [Hereinafter Friedman and Himmelstein 2006].
Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger, The Promise of Mediation: The Transformative Approach to
Conflict, Rev. ed. (Jossey-Bass: 2005).
E. Patrick McDermott and Ruth Obar, “What’s Going On In Mediation: An Empirical Analysis of the
Influence of a Mediator’s Style on Party Satisfaction and Monetary Benefit,” 9 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 75,
108–109 (2004) [Hereinafter McDermott and Obar 2004].
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b. Using Mediation to Resolve Investment Disputes
UNCTAD has commented favorably about the creating of mediation as a
pre-arbitration means of settling disputes, explaining “mediation may be a
more useful means of reaching an amicable settlement than the use of
comparatively formal conciliation proceedings.”123 Nevertheless, at present,
ICSID does not provide mediation services. ICSID has expressed interest in
establishing a mediation facility to allow parties to resolve disputes on a more
informal, voluntary and confidential basis—possibly even with a neutral who
does not have subject matter expertise.124 This approach may serve to facilitate
communication, decrease the risk that settlement will cause a party to lose
face, and narrow the issues in a dispute in order to achieve cost and time
savings.125 While there have been some suggestions about what the process might
entail, the future of ICSID’s efforts to create a mediation facility is uncertain.126
Policymakers wanting to provide for mediation would need to address various
structural matters such as: (1) should mediation be mandatory, (2) would or
could it occur independently or concurrently with an imposed ADR process,
or (3) whether it would be institutional or ad hoc. There might also be concerns
about procedural issues, including the process of selecting mediators, the
language and location of the mediation and the rules regarding confidentiality.127

c. Using Conciliation to Resolve Investment Disputes
ICSID does have a facilitative ADR system for resolving investment disputes.
Observing that there is a “particular importance to the availability of facilities
for international conciliation,” the ICSID Convention establishes a process for
making a request for conciliation, constituting a Conciliation Commission
and defining the duties of the conciliators.128 The Convention requires a
Commission “to clarify the issues in dispute between the parties and to
endeavor to bring about agreement between them upon mutually acceptable
123
124
125
126

127
128

UNCTAD 2005b, pp. 53–54.
ICSID 2004, p. 4; Onwuamaegbu 2005.
Onwuamaegbu 2005.
There was a suggestion that mediation should be without prejudice to the rights of parties in other forms
of dispute resolution. Similarly, it was suggested that mediation be conducted alongside arbitration proceedings so that a settlement agreement might ultimately be incorporated into an award pursuant to
ICSID Arbitration Rules 43(2). Id.
Diaz and Oretskin 2001, p. 8.
ICSID 2006, pp. 19–21.
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terms [and]… may at any stage of the proceedings and from time to time
recommend terms of settlement to the parties”. Meanwhile, it obligates the
parties to “cooperate in good faith …[and] give their most serious consideration
to [the Commission’s] recommendations.”129
While the ICSID’s Conciliation Rules do not articulate how the Commission
and the parties should carry out their respective mandates, the Rules suggest
the Commission may wish to take a more evaluative approach130 Rule 22
permits the Commission at any time (either orally or in writing) to “recommend that the parties accept specific terms of settlement or that they refrain …
from specific acts that might aggravate the dispute [and] point out to the parties the arguments in favor of its recommendations.” In keeping with the more
formal nature of conciliation, the Conciliation Rules also let the Commission
request written statements from the parties, rule on its own jurisdiction, rule
on requests to disqualify conciliators, hold hearings, and take evidence in the
form of documents or witness testimony and issue a report at the closure of
the proceedings.131 Despite these suggested formalities, neither the ICSID
Convention nor the Conciliation Rules suggest that conciliators are prohibited
from engaging in less formal or facilitative actions; this implicitly suggests
conciliators retain discretion to fashion the “forum to the fuss.”
The Convention and Conciliation Rules require the Conciliation Commission
to prepare a report. If the conciliation was successful, the report notes the
issues in dispute and records that the parties have reached agreement. If, on
the other hand, it appears to the Commission at any time during the process
that there is no likelihood of agreement, the Commission’s report must simply
note the submission of the dispute to conciliation and record the parties’
inability to reach agreement.132
In its effort to promote conciliation and provide investment-related dispute
resolution services, ICSID also has Additional Facility Conciliation Rules for
investor-State disputes where the parties have consented to conciliation. The
formal procedures for Additional Facility Conciliation are similar to the
conciliation procedures occurring under the ICSID Convention, including
129
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Id., Art. 34(1), p. 21. This is not dissimilar from the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules that permit the
conciliator, at any stage of the proceedings, to make proposals for the settlement of a dispute (Nassib G.
Ziadé, “ICSID Conciliation,” 13(2) News from ICSID, 3 (1996) [Hereinafter Ziadé 1996], p. 6).
Nurick and Schnably 1986, p. 348.
ICSID 2006, pp. 89–97.
ICSID 2006, pp. 21, 97–98; Onwuamaegbu 2005.
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requesting written statements from the parties, challenges to jurisdiction and
disqualification of conciliators, taking of evidence and issuing a report.133
As of 2006, ICSID’s website reflects that it has only had five cases registered
for conciliation: SEDITEX Engineering Beratungsgesellschaft für die
Textilindustrie m.b.H. v. Madagascar (ICSID Case No. CONC/82/1); Tesoro
Petroleum Corp. v. Trinidad and Tobago (ICSID Case No. CONC/83/1);
SEDITEX Engineering Beratungsgesellschaft für die Textilindustrie m.b.H. v.
Madagascar (ICSID Case No. CONC/94/1); TG World Petroleum Ltd. v. Niger
(ICSID Case No. CONC/03/1); and Togo Electricité v. Republic of Togo (ICSID
Case No. CONC/05/1).134 It is not apparent whether all these are all investment treaty cases, as substantive information about these conciliations is not
publicly accessible. But to the extent that all ICSID cases involve investment
conflict, the available information suggests that conciliation can be effective in
fostering settlement. In two cases, TG World and the first SEDITEX conciliation, the parties reached a settlement soon after the request for conciliation
was registered and before a Commission was established. In a third case—in
which Lord Wilberforce acted as sole conciliator—Tesoro ended with a
successful settlement that caused counsel for the host country to write “use of
ICSID’s conciliation facilities deserves serious consideration in every case.”135
The second SEDITEX case appears not to have been subject to further dispute
resolution and was not registered for ICSID arbitration. In only one case, Togo
Electricité, conciliation efforts appear to have been unsuccessful, and ICSID
registered a request for arbitration in the four days after the conciliation
proceedings closed.136
Although limited in number, these cases suggest that certain types of cases
may be well-suited for conciliation. Noting that arbitration may be too adversarial in some cases, counsel from ICSID explains that conciliation can be
most effective in “cases in which the parties are engaged in an ongoing longterm project, involving significant amounts in sunk costs, where it is necessary
to resolve disputes while the project is continuing. Disputes in oil and gas
exploration projects, particularly, come to mind—as do mining and long-term
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ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility Rules, ICSID/11 (Apr. 2006) (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/
AFR_English-final.pdf) [Hereinafter ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2006], pp. 27–42.
ICSID, List of Pending Cases (as of 26 July 2006) (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm)
and List of Concluded Cases (as of 26 July 2006) (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm)
[Hereinafter ICSID Pending and Concluded Cases 2006]; Onwuamaegbu 2005.
Nurick and Schnably 1986, p. 344.
ICSID Pending and Concluded Cases 2006.
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infrastructure projects.”137 Overall, the general anecdotal evidence suggests
that conciliation can be used directly (as in Tesoro) or indirectly (as in TG
World and SEDITEX) to facilitate settlement.

d. Challenges for Facilitative ADR
Despite this rosy picture, there are limitations to facilitative dispute resolution.
Both mediation and conciliation can only be as effective as the parties wish it
to be; and this factor may be governed by the parties’ immediate circumstances
and the nature of the dispute.138 Beyond this, there are difficulties generalizing
about the efficacy of mediation and conciliation on the basis of ICSID’s
conciliation data. There is a risk that the small and limited set of data from
ICSID suffers from sample bias. First, it is not clear whether the cases in which
parties opted to conciliate are representative of the broader class of investment
disputes, let alone treaty-based investment disputes. If the five cases were
atypical, then there would be doubt as to the generalizability of conciliation’s
utility in other situations. Second, the data only relate to conciliation at ICSID
and do not address mediation or conciliation that occurs on an ad hoc basis or
through a different institution. Given the unique nature of the ICSID
Convention and ICSID Conciliation, it is possible that mediation or conciliation
occurring under different auspices may be less (or possibly more) successful.
It would be helpful to analyze how investment disputes might be resolved, for
example, under the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules. Third, the success of
mediation or conciliation may depend heavily upon the identity of the thirdparty neutral. Where the parties have greater confidence in the neutral, the
recommendations are likely to carry greater weight and positively influence
settlement.139 Likewise, if parties appoint neutrals with an insufficient degree
of respect from both parties, they may be less successful.
With only five conciliation cases against 132 arbitration cases registered at
ICSID in 2005,140 the sheer numbers suggest that ICSID Conciliation is a
disfavored dispute resolution mechanism. Various factors may have led to this
phenomenon. It may be caused by a lack of awareness of its existence. Counsel
at ICSID has commented that “the Centre has recently begun to remind
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Merrills 2005, pp. 41–44, 88–90.
Nurick and Schnably 1986, p. 345.
UNCTAD 2005b, pp. 4–5.
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parties of the existence of the [conciliation] mechanism.”141 This can cause
downstream problems, as parties may be hesitant to use a dispute resolution
mechanism viewed as untried and untested.
The lack of use may also be a function of the ready availability of arbitration in
BITs and parties’ preference for binding adjudication. Parties may view such
non-binding dispute resolution as little more than a needless and timeconsuming exercise, as it can involve as much time as, and comparable expenses
to, binding dispute resolution. Particularly, investors that have already
experienced “protracted correspondence, negotiation, and perhaps even
administrative battles with the State” may believe “the time has come for more
forceful steps. Likewise, State parties may be unwilling to participate in a
process that will not yield a solution imposed from the outside, for bureaucratic and political reasons.”142 Nevertheless, in certain cases, the “prospect of
a binding award may be necessary to motivate one party or the other to
bargain seriously” in conciliation.143
Negotiated and facilitated ADR share common difficulties. Like its negotiated
counterpart, facilitated ADR experiences challenges in obtaining party consent.
Part of the problem may be a lack of an express consent to a facilitative ADR
method in a BIT. Even with pre-existing consent, parties may not elect to use
it or may choose to use it in a dilatory manner. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah
has suggested that conciliation can “be frustrated by the adoption of dilatory
tactics.”144 In addition, there can be challenges with including the appropriate
stakeholders and securing enforcement. In the public international law
context, one need only consider the Rainbow Warrior situation, where France
failed to abide by the terms of its mediated settlement and a binding dispute
resolution was ultimately required.145
Facilitative ADR experiences other unique issues. As a neutral is involved in
the facilitation process, it is vital to ensure that the neutral is both perceived to
be and actually is independent and impartial. Decision-facilitators that lack
these qualities may have an adverse impact on the legitimacy of the dispute
resolution process. Another concern is that, given recent concerns about transparency, governments may be disinclined to be involved in non-transparent
141
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dispute resolution mechanisms. Since facilitative ADR usually occurs in private
and is often subject to confidentiality obligations, this may run counter toward
the trend toward increased governmental openness.146 However, facilitated
ADR mechanisms are different from imposed ADR mechanisms that provide a
public function by adjudicating public rights. Facilitative ADR is not rightsbased adjudication and the creation of legal norms, as it is primarily concerned
with interest-based dispute resolution. Unlike fact-finding or imposed ADR, in
which confidentiality inhibits a full and informed discussion of the disputes,
confidentiality in facilitated ADR is necessary to promote a forthright and
effective discussion about the parties’ mutual interests and concerns. Without
confidentiality, the system functions inefficiently; it creates discomfort that
inhibits the full and frank discussions that can lead to the articulation of party
interests and mutually satisfactory resolutions.147 If parties were concerned that
comments would be used against them later, this would inhibit the discussion
necessary to create opportunities for a win-win settlement.148
Consideration of these concerns is vital. Nevertheless, “the unprecedented
number of pending investor-State cases and the rate at which new cases are
filed would seem to warrant a renewed dose of ‘serious consideration’ with a
view to more fully institutionalizing” some sort of facilitated ADR regime.149
Using dispute systems design to diagnose and appropriately adapt the system
could integrate the strengths of a facilitative process while minimizing the
risks of the challenges.

Fact-Finding ADR
Rather than a formal adjudication of substantive rights, fact-finding ADR
mechanisms involve identifying a neutral expert or special master to engage in
basic fact-finding in a dispute. This mechanism is similar to an expert
determination where a neutral fact-finder, presumably with subject matter
expertise, finally resolves fundamental—yet contested—issues.150
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a. The Benefits of Fact-Finding
Fact-finding has the potential to narrow the matters in dispute and create
common ground between the parties. Particularly where there is a discrete
issue—such as asset valuation—that can be definitively resolved at an earlier
stage, this might lead to a quick resolution of a dispute. Put in more commercial
terms, using fact-finding to determine the scope of damages before liability
may permit parties to bargain more effectively once the scope of precise liability
is defined. Using fact-finding could save time and costs, permit investors to
concentrate on their core business and let host countries focus on the more
pressing duties of government. Likewise, narrowing the scope of a potential
dispute provides an opportunity to decrease the risk of escalating or exacerbating a dispute, which may be important when there is an ongoing relationship. Beyond this, a fact-finding body can construct a historical record
that—much like the work of truth and reconciliation commissions—may
produce benefits for both the parties and society at large.151
Unfortunately, the practical utility of using fact-finding to resolve investment
disputes is under-explored. Theoretically, as neither the Convention nor the
Rules expressly prohibit such actions, an ICSID Conciliation Commission might
be able to engage in fact-finding as part of its mandate for recommending settlement terms. ICSID Conciliation Rule 22(2) implies that fact-finding may be a
critical facility as, when it issues recommendations, the Commission “shall
point out to the parties the arguments in favor of its recommendations.”152
Given the confidentiality limitations of ICSID Conciliation, there is little
information on how neutral experts or panels resolve disputed factual issues
through a conciliation facility.
Luckily, in 1978 ICSID created provisions for Additional Facility Fact-Finding.
Aaron Broches, ICSID’s Secretary-General when the Fact Finding Rules were
introduced, observed that the processes would provide parties with an impartial
assessment of facts to prevent disputes on specific factual issues and the
escalation of disputes.153
Unlike conciliation and arbitration, ICSID’s Fact-Finding Rules do not require
at least one party be an ICSID member. Rather, provided both parties agree,
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any investor or government can initiate a fact finding proceeding. The FactFinding Rules provide that an independent committee—comprised of a sole
or uneven number of commissioners—will examine the disputed facts and
provide the parties with an impartial assessment.154 The Rules envisage that
there will be oral proceedings, written submissions, evidence and witness
testimony. The Fact-Finding proceedings end with a Report that “shall be
limited to findings of fact. The Report shall not contain any recommendations
to the parties nor shall it have the character of an award,” and the parties will
be “entirely free as to the effect to be given to the Report.”155 Although the
parties could agree otherwise, it is, in other words, primarily a form of
non-binding dispute resolution.
As originally conceived, Additional Facility Fact-Finding was intended to be
“a process for preventing, rather than settling legal disputes as a result of a
perceived need for fact-finding proceedings in the ‘pre-dispute’ stage.”156
Nevertheless, in nearly 30 years, no cases have ever been brought under this
Facility.157 This may be due to many of the same problems facing ICSID
Conciliation. People may be unaware of the existence of the Fact-Finding
Facility. Moreover, the lack of a critical mass of cases establishing it as a tried
and tested method of dispute resolution may inhibit parties from using it. The
default, non-binding nature of the fact-finding may also make it inappropriate
for some cases.158
Although the Fact-Finding Facility has suffered from non-use, fact-finding
deserves renewed consideration. There are minimal institutional costs to
maintaining the current facility. Reconsidering its structure and finding ways
to make it more acceptable to stakeholders might actually increase the utility
of the process.
In the public international law context, fact-finding bodies, such as the
“inquiry” process at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, have been useful in
making an impartial investigation of disputed facts. The Dogger Bank incident
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is a classic example. In Dogger Bank, a Russian fleet on its way through the
North Sea fired on English commercial fishing trawlers; one vessel was sunk,
the remaining two ships were seriously damaged, and there were two dead and
six wounded among the civilian crew. The Russians claimed they were attacked
by Japanese torpedo boats mingling with the trawlers; if this were true, it
would have justified the Russian action. The parties submitted this disputed
factual issue to an International Commission of Inquiry. The inquiry found
“there was no torpedo boat either among the trawlers nor on the spot, [and]
the fire opened by Admiral Rozhdestvensky was not justifiable.” After this
single fact was established, the conflict was resolved and Russia gave the United
Kingdom an indemnity of £65,000.159 Cases such as this suggest that there is
hidden utility in this methodology that deserves further exploration.

b. The Challenges of Using Fact-Finding to Resolve Investment Conflict
There are various difficulties associated with using Fact-Finding ADR. Dogger
Bank is only one of five fact-finding commissions at the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, which suggests fact-finding processes may not be suitable for
broad types of dispute resolution.160 Moreover, as investment disputes often
involve disputes of fact, law and mixed questions of fact and law, many cases
may not be suitable for fact-finding. Pure fact-finding commissions might
complicate—rather than streamline—the dispute resolution process. As factfinding does not generally appear as a dispute resolution option in investment
treaties, it may prove difficult to get party consent. After a dispute has arisen,
it may be challenging to secure party agreement on the use of fact-finding.
There may be other difficulties. Both the investor and State must be willing to
accept that a fact-finding body—possibly in public161—may show that their
159
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version of the facts is wrong. As a practical matter, parties may be unwilling to
subject themselves to the scrutiny and potential embarrassment. There is some
evidence that States may be particularly sensitive to a risk of loss, particularly
when it involves reputational harm.162 Finally, there may be enforcement
difficulties, particularly where parties have not agreed to be bound by the
factual determinations. While noteworthy, these concerns should not mean
investors and States reject this option out of hand. Rather, parties may wish to
consider creating a system that incorporates fact-finding facilities at an
appropriate juncture for appropriate disputes.

Advisory ADR
Advisory ADR might be used to evaluate and “reality-test” the parties’ respective claims so that they can make more informed decisions as to the utility of
pursuing formal adjudication. This might involve engaging in some sort of early
evaluation by a neutral, a mini-trial or some form of non-binding arbitration.

a. Opportunities for Advisory ADR
In early neutral evaluation, parties may choose a third party to provide an
opinion on a legal issue in dispute. In the U.S. domestic context, early neutral
evaluation has been used successfully to resolve claims. One empirical study
indicates that 80% of lawyers who were required by a court to go through this
process later reported they were satisfied with the process and would voluntarily
use early neutral evaluation in the future. The same study also suggested that
the key predictor to having a successful early neutral evaluation was the
attitude and skills of the neutral evaluator.163
A mini-trial typically involves attorneys for each side presenting the major
aspects of their case to a tribunal composed of their respective clients as well
as a presiding neutral who can then advise about a probable outcome and
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work with the clients to facilitate settlement.164 Corporate entities have used
mini-trials successfully to promote the free exchange of information and focus
the minds of top management on the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases. The private nature of this process has the potential to minimize costs
and time allocated to dispute resolution, preserve an on-going relationship and
avoid potential public embarrassment.
Little work has been done to consider how these procedures might apply in
the context of investment disputes. This may be due to the challenges that
these forms of dispute resolution are likely to face. Presumably some of the
benefits of early neutral evaluation might be captured by formats such as
ICSID Conciliation or ICSID Additional Facility Conciliation. Moreover, there
is an argument that ICSID Conciliation already essentially is non-binding
arbitration. There may be critical benefits to working within an existing
institution, such as ICSID. Provided it is not inconsistent with the ICSID
Convention, it may be possible to modify the nature of the dispute resolution
services—or the parties’ expectations in how they will be utilized—in order to
capture benefits from other ADR formats.

b. Challenges Related to Advisory ADR
Despite the benefits, there are inevitably potential costs. Mini-trial and nonbinding arbitration have challenges similar to those experienced by imposed
ADR—namely they arguably have all of the costs and none of the benefits of
reaching a binding decision. Moreover, to the extent that these non-binding
proceedings have the look and feel of binding dispute resolution but are
nevertheless private, there may still be concerns related to the public interest
and a lack of transparency. Particularly in the context of a mini-trial, nongovernmental organizations may wish to participate in the process; and there
may be repercussions for exclusion. One also wonders, however, whether
States have the same cost-benefit calculus as investors. Presumably foreign
investors are rationale actors motivated by the need for profit and would be
willing to settle under the acceptable commercial conditions; nevertheless, this
may not always be the case and investors may not be able to use the process
effectively. Meanwhile, host country governments—who may be influenced by
commercial realities—may be more motivated by political objectives.
They may also lack the flexibility to settle on purely commercial terms.
164
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Other factors such as clear authority to settle, the availability of funds, the
legal risk and the likelihood of recovery may affect a government’s ability to
accept the result of early neutral evaluation or a mini-trial. Nevertheless, it is
possible that certain disputes might benefit from the availability of this
process, and thus this issue is worthy of more systematic consideration.

Imposed ADR
Imposed ADR is at the most formal end of the dispute resolution continuum.
Imposed ADR procedures typically involve an adjudicatory body making a
final and binding decision. In this context, adjudicators are typically neutral
and may base their decisions upon legal principles.165 In the international
context, the precise format of imposed ADR can vary. The adjudicators might
be either arbitrators or judges; and judges may either come from national
courts or international judicial bodies. The adjudication process may occur at
a mixed claims commission, a claims tribunal akin to the Iran–U.S. Claims
Tribunal, a series of independent ad hoc arbitral tribunals, or litigation under
the auspices of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It might also take the
form of international litigation before a national court. Under each of these
approaches, the adjudicators will be bound to follow different set of rules and
regulations during the process of resolving the parties’ dispute.

a. The Benefits of Imposed ADR
This chapter has already alluded to a variety of benefits to using an imposed
ADR option. The nature of imposed ADR makes its availability critical to
promote the final and binding adjudication—and permit bargaining in its
proverbial shadow. Many (but not all) imposed ADR methods—particularly
arbitration and national court judgments—have the benefit of efficient
international enforceability. Imposed ADR has also experienced an increased
push toward transparency, which promotes democratic values. Admittedly,
imposed ADR varies in its commitment to transparency. The proceedings
before the ICJ and the Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal are typically open to the
public. Many—but not all—national courts are transparent. Meanwhile, there
is an increasing trend toward transparency in investment treaty arbitration.166
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Specific forms of imposed ADR may have unique benefits. Arbitration and
mixed claims commissions have the added benefit of being able to tailor the
procedural framework to the issues in the particular dispute. They also offer
the benefit of limited opportunities to attack the adjudicator’s decision, which
further streamlines the dispute resolution procedure. Presumably, such tailoring
is likely to create disputes that may be faster and less expensive than their
counterparts in national court litigation. Beyond this, there may be utility in
being able to “blame any unfavorable result on three foreign arbitrators” and
shift responsibility away from the parties.167

b. The Costs of Imposed ADR
Nevertheless, not all of these theoretical benefits are realized. Arbitration has
particular risks.
i. Lost Time and Money
Cases can take years to arbitrate and cost more than litigation or other forms
of dispute resolution.168 Anecdotal evidence in the investment context
suggests a similar phenomenon, which suggests that—rather than focusing on
their core commercial or governmental objectives—parties expend significant
resources on dispute resolution. Even investors that have successfully claimed
under investment suggest that investment arbitration is simply “too slow, too
costly and too indeterminate.”169 Increased fiscal costs for resolving disputes
implicate other hidden costs, which may limit parties’ access to justice.
A smaller corporate investor, particularly with a small dispute, may be unable
to pursue arbitration because of the extensive costs—even though the investor
is being deprived of investment rights. The situation is more pronounced when
a group of small companies are each experiencing distinct deprivations, but
have no commercial choice but to absorb the cost of the violation of their legal
rights.170 Likewise, a host country government with limited financial resources
may experience a similar phenomenon when it must defend itself on an
inadequate budget. Ultimately, the financial cost of imposed ADR may,
167
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as a practical matter, limit those who have access to the forum. This suggests
that the stakeholders may be benefited from a system that provides a broader
set of ADR mechanisms.
ii. Arbitrator Neutrality
There are also concerns that arbitrators are not perceived to be neutral in their
adjudication. While there are opportunities to challenge arbitrators who lack
impartiality or independence, there are nonetheless continuing reasons for
parties’ negative perceptions of the fairness and integrity of the dispute resolution
process. There may, for example, be difficulties related to an arbitrator’s potential
“issue conflicts,” where the same person serves as arbitrator and counsel in
two separate cases with related legal issues and has the capacity to create legal
authority as an arbitrator that may be of benefit to a client in his or her role as
counsel.171 Similarly, arbitrators may act as non-neutrals or advocates; there is
also the possibility of “toxic” arbitrators who may disrupt or delay proceedings
to the advantage of one party.172
iii. Party Control Over Outcome
Although control of the dispute resolution process is also a benefit, this may
be illusory. Investment treaties typically present investors with pre-determined
options for where and how their disputes can be resolved through arbitration.
Although having one option is better than none, one wonders, for example,
why countries would want to close the door to their local courthouses or other
forms of imposed ADR. For example, although Mexico is willing to entertain
NAFTA-based investment litigation, domestic legislation in the United States
and Canada appears to prevent foreign investors from bringing NAFTA claims
in their respective national courts.173 Likewise, one wonders whether Argentina
would have been happier with an option to create a mixed claims commission
to deal with the universe of claims it received as a result of its currency crisis.
Beyond a simple choice of forum, requiring arbitration presupposes the use of
procedural rules that investors had little opportunity to negotiate; and while
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parties can attempt to agree to variations after the fact, as a practical matter
this may prove challenging once a dispute has arisen.
iv. Transposing Benefits into Costs: Confidentiality and Discretion
In the context of treaty arbitration, some of the benefits of arbitration can
become costs. Confidentiality and discretion are two key examples.
Confidentiality was historically extolled as a reason to opt for arbitration.
Nevertheless, the lack of transparency of the awards and the process of
resolving investment disputes has costs. Investment treaties are public
documents that articulate public law rights, which are fundamentally different
from private commercial rights in at least two ways.
First, treaty disputes have considerable third-party implications that implicate
the public interest.174 Beyond the effect experienced by a foreign investor or its
shareholders, investment arbitration affects taxpayers of the host government as
well as entities impacted by its legislative and regulatory choices.175 Excluding
those impacted by the resolution of the investment dispute can foster a sense of
unfairness and a lack of procedural justice. Particularly for democratic institutions with a tradition of giving the governed a voice in the process of government, this can lead to a backlash with financial and political costs. As a result, it
is unsurprising that governments such as those of the United States and Canada
have worked to redress this procedural difficulty by making access to awards,
pleadings and hearings more open.176 What is more surprising, however, is the
failure of other countries with democratic institutions to follow this lead.
Second, because these awards interpret new international investment rights,
keeping treaty claims confidential prevents the efficient and consistent development of a coherent and considered legal doctrine. Unlike commercial law
where there is a developed body of law and precedent, investment treaty law is
relatively new. As a result, there is a dearth of established legal doctrine. The
awards in recent cases that are publicly available have only just begun to sketch
the boundaries of legal rights, and the academic literature is still in its formative
years. While making awards public arguably increases the cost of arbitration—
as tribunals and parties must address them—this overlooks fundamental costs
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of confidentiality. The availability of analogous cases, legal reasoning or amicus
submissions can increase the efficiency of a tribunal’s determinations and
improve the quality of the tribunal’s reasoning. In addition, by signaling that
like cases will be treated alike, it promotes perceptions of fairness and
supports the legitimacy of the process.
Confidentiality also leads to uncertainty for both investors and host
governments attempting, respectively, to organize their investments, make
governmental policy and determine dispute resolution strategy. Without a
sense of how the law will be applied—and access to the awards making those
determinations—there can be little justified reliance. While investment
arbitration awards are not de jure precedent, tribunals and parties treat them
as de facto authority and rely upon them. Keeping cases confidential deprives
tribunals of useful reasoning, prevents tribunals from treating like cases alike
and also denies investors and governments a reasonable opportunity to organize
their respective affairs in accordance with articulated legal standards.
It seems that governments originally thought that confidentiality was appropriate. Presumably this may have been because they anticipated that there
would only be a small number of claims and there was no need to publicize the
possibility of government liability; governments may also have been less concerned about inconsistencies in the decisions because, with confidentiality,
there would be blissful ignorance of potential inconsistencies. Recent history,
however, demonstrates the fallacy of both these propositions. The number of
claims has increased; and as arbitrators search for authority to inform their
own reasoning when faced with novel legal rights, they have sought out
similar awards. Because of the critical nature of the issues raised in investment
disputes, awards have found their way into the public domain. As the historical
benefit becomes a liability, the future challenge will be how best to manage the
need for confidentiality against the desirability of public access.
The use of arbitrators’ open-textured discretion to adjudicate cases has also
created unexpected costs.177 In some contexts, parties may need arbitrators to
exercise more discretion to issue awards quickly with minimal legal reasoning.
This might be desirable in certain circumstances. For example, in labor
arbitration there is a preference for final discretionary awards that need not be
consistent; this can help prevent labor unrest. Nevertheless, in the context of
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investment treaty claims, unreasoned and quick awards may be undesirable. It
can create confusion. Unexplained decisions create difficulties for parties and
arbitrators in understanding the scope of substantive investor protections and
what circumstances should constitute liability-creating events. It can also
increase litigation risk where tribunals make procedural determinations with
an outcome-determinative effect. If, for example, tribunals exercise discretion
to shift arbitration costs under the applicable rules—but they do not explain
either the legal authority for or their rationale for making a decision—parties
may question the fairness and basis of the determination. Likewise, if arbitrators do not shift costs, and still do not explain why, investors and governments
are again left in the same precarious situations wondering what factors justify
the determination. Perhaps more importantly, investors and host governments
involved in future disputes will have minimal information available to them to
predict how future tribunals might evaluate costs-related measures, which
may not be an insignificant aspect in the case. In Aguas Del Tunari v. Bolivia,
while the investor claimed at least US$25,000,000 in damages, the settlement
ultimately made Bolivia responsible for US$1,600,000 in legal fees—well over
5% of the claimed compensation.178 As parties bargain in the shadow of the
law, relying on arbitrator discretion—without information about how rules,
standards, practice, and precedence will influence the exercise of that
discretion—prevents parties from negotiating effectively. Without reliable and
predictable information about the potential costs of the arbitration procedure,
there could be an adverse impact on parties’ capacity to engage in an accurate
and clear cost-benefit calculus.

c. Moving Beyond Investment Treaty Arbitration
Ultimately, investment treaty arbitration may not be everything its creators
wished it to be. There are a variety of factors that suggest the theoretical benefits
of arbitration may not materialize and purported benefits can transform into
costs. This ultimately suggests that it is unwise to focus unduly on arbitration
as an all-purpose paradigm.
It does suggest that the time is right to consider proactively how to use other
imposed ADR mechanisms—such as a claims commission—to resolve
disputes with finality. There have been some suggestions, for instance, that this
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format might address concerns related both to transparency and consistency.179
Likewise, it suggests that it may be useful to think systematically about the
range of ADR mechanisms. As this chapter suggests, other processes—
particularly underutilized facilities at ICSID and with ombuds—are promising
options. The challenge will be to determine the right blend of party autonomy,
efficiency and due process for a wide range of circumstances.
There has been some scholarship that has begun to consider how specific
aspects of the ADR continuum, namely mediation and conciliation, might
usefully improve the system.180 Coe has made significant strides in thinking
systematically about how and when to use facilitated ADR in connection with
imposed ADR. Nevertheless, one wonders whether this conception of the
problem is overly narrow. The challenge may be to expand one’s conception of
conflict management to think more broadly about how to diagnose the difficulties the system is facing, critique the existing process and provide principles
to guide the creation of effective and legitimate dispute resolution systems.

Challenges for the Future
The challenge for the future is how to think seriously about the value of designing comprehensive dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve investment
disputes. Being systematic in the approach to conflict management could
provide a unique opportunity to capitalize on the efficiency of various
processes across the ADR continuum. It also provides an opportunity to
increase satisfaction both with the process and the ultimate result, as well as
promoting integrity of the dispute resolution system. Nevertheless, there will
be challenges as different governments perhaps make different assessments of
the utility of engaging in this level of conflict management.
We are at a unique historical juncture in the evolution of resolving investment-related disputes. We have an opportunity not just to ask how to improve
the arbitration system by focusing on issues such as transparency, consistency
and coherence; rather we can and should consider how to manage conflict
related to investment treaties in a systematic manner. Arbitration is no doubt
part of that puzzle. But as the review of the dispute resolution continuum
suggests, there are other opportunities worthy of ongoing consideration.
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The opportunity to decrease costs, increase efficiency and interject procedural
fairness in the system should not be discounted. The evaluation of the
structure can provide a reasoned explanation for the status quo and give
stakeholders affected by the outcome of disputes a chance to participate in the
system’s creation. Ultimately, such an analysis has the unique benefit of
strengthening the legitimacy of the dispute resolution process and giving
stakeholders confidence in the system’s capacity to protect their rights and
produce just results.
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